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Abstract: A ban on pricing below cost was implemented under the 1987 Groceries Order based on
the premise that loss leading used in multi-product retail pricing distorts competition and exploits
consumers in the short run, while driving a more concentrated structure and reducing welfare in
the long run. Loss leading is examined for multi-product retailers selling in imperfectly competitive
market niches with imperfect consumer information. We develop a theoretical argument in a simple
two-stage framework that illustrates how loss leading on a subset of products is an equilibrium
outcome of price competition that leaves overall welfare equal to that observed under laissez faire.
I  INTRODUCTION
he practice of below-cost pricing in multi-product retail markets has T attracted a great deal of controversy regarding its appropriate legislative
treatment under competition law. The dilemma facing anti-trust authorities is
evident in the differential legal treatment of below-cost pricing across different
countries. Restrictions on the specific practice of below-cost pricing are in place
in Ireland, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and Portugal. No such restrictions
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exist in Denmark, Germany, Spain, or Italy. The problem arises in distinguishing
between below-cost pricing activities that are a legitimate outcome of the
competitive process, and those that are inherently anti-competitive with adverse
consequences for market structure and welfare. We consider this problem in
the context of the Irish retail grocery market, where the practice of below-cost
selling is explicitly prohibited under the 1987 Groceries Order on the basis that
such pricing strategies drive a more concentrated market structure and are
welfare reducing. The following section traces the structural evolution of the
Irish groceries market from the 1970s to its current dual configuration, where
separate “one-stop” and “convenience” markets comprise the core feature of urban
areas. Within this setting, the justification for the introduction and maintenance
of the ban on below-cost selling in the Irish grocery market is outlined in
Section III.
In Section IV we confirm that loss leading can be an equilibrium outcome
observed under conditions of imperfect competition between firms and imperfect
consumer information over products. The pertinent issue is whether loss leading
on “Known-Value Items” justifies intervention in the form of price controls. Is it
a form of predatory pricing or price discrimination that reduces long-run welfare,
or is the market self-correcting, in that rivals discipline each other through
strategic interactions to leave welfare at the full information level? We consider
this issue within the second best world of imperfect competition and consumer
information.
II  DUALISM IN THE IRISH GROCERY MARKET
Historically the Irish retail grocery market was characterised by a fragmented
structure with a large number of small independent retailers competing for a
common consumer base. However this sector has experienced mass structural
upheaval since the development of supermarkets in the 1970s. In contrast to
the structure of earlier decades, modern grocery retailing is highly concentrated
with the top 5 per cent of outlets accounting for almost 70 per cent of total food
turnover as illustrated in Figure 1. Market share data in Table 1 show Multiples,
which describe larger supermarkets operating with several branches, dominating
in Dublin and other densely populated areas around the country. Symbol Groups1
and Independent retailers dominate elsewhere. We observe that Multiples have
not entered many regional areas where the catchment market in the surrounding
areas is insufficient to justify their entry on a large scale. In these areas, Symbols
and Independents jointly cater for both “one-stop” and “convenience” shopping.
For this reason we focus on urban areas, which account for most of the turnover
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in the Irish Grocery Market, in our analysis of the ban. This analysis depends
strongly on the argument that “one-stop” and “convenience” shopping are
fundamentally independent markets, which we now justify.
The observed pattern of rising concentration noticeable in urban areas since
the late 1970s is a natural outcome of demand and supply driven forces. Large
scale retailing allowed the benefits of scale and scope economies to be reaped.
Bulk buying, lower supplier distribution costs, and increased retailer power
over suppliers created the possibility for the provision of a wider range of products
at lower prices in supermarkets as compared with the traditional outlet. Price
competition between supermarket retailers over the valuable “one-stop” shopper
ensured that these efficiency gains were passed on to supermarket patrons.
The demand for “one-stop-trolley” shopping was stimulated by the lower prices
and wider product choice offered, in addition to developing consumer mobility
and increased awareness of time as a scarce resource. The expansion of these
productive and allocatively efficient supermarket outlets resulted in the exit of
many smaller independent outlets over the 1980s as illustrated in Figure 2. It
is noteworthy that the Independent share of the total market continued to decline
in the years preceding 1996, even in the presence of the ban on below-cost selling
implemented in 1987.
Independent retailing in urban areas has adopted a role that differs greatly
from the traditionally defined independent store catering for all consumer needs,
which can still exist in rural areas. Independent retailers now target a specific
“convenience” niche of the market, providing longer opening hours and greater
locational convenience for the consumer. In addition, these outlets tend to
specialise in a range of products which can be described as non-routine items
purchased on “impulse” such as confectionery, daily routine purchase items such
as newspapers, and other non-routine “top-up” items bought at irregular hours
in small quantities between supermarket visits. Consumers do not tend to buy
a weekly supply of these types of good in a “one-stop” supermarket shop.
Independents are an important distributing outlet for these commodities, as
exemplified by the sale of confectionery where it is estimated that 60 per cent of
adult purchases are on impulse and 67 per cent of total confectionery sales are
through Independent outlets (Checkout, 1996). A market niche has therefore
evolved for the smaller independent outlets in the urban grocery market.
It is clear that Multiples offer an entirely different product and target a
different consumer base from the Independent sector. As a result, the grocery
market in urban areas has evolved to a mature efficient dual structure where
competition between Multiples in the “one-stop-trolley” market is largely
separable from the smaller independent retail outlets who operate in their own
“convenience” niche. Since the dual structure ensures the independence of these
niches, we model competition between retailers operating within their relevant74 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
“one-stop” or “convenience” niches of the market in our theoretical analysis of
the Groceries Order.2 It is a maintained assumption throughout this paper that
the evolution of structure in the “convenience” niche is unaffected by the nature
of competition between larger outlets selling into the “one-stop” market. As we
highlight in the following section, this approach differs greatly from proponents
of the ban who base their arguments on the assumption that both Multiples
and Independents compete within the same market segments. While this may
be the case in rural regions, these areas account for only a small proportion of
total grocery turnover.
III  MOTIVATION FOR THE BAN ON BELOW-COST SELLING AND
THE IMPLICATIONS OF DUALISM
The presence of dualism in the Irish Grocery Market undermines the whole
rationale behind the introduction of the ban. The persistent rise in concentration
and the widespread practice of pricing below-cost on certain commodity items
by large retailers led many to question the role which market forces actually
played in the changing face of Irish grocery retailing. Many felt that larger
retailers were using below-cost pricing, or a practice known as loss leading, to
manage the market, leading to the exit of many medium and small retailers
and reducing welfare in the long run. Loss leading occurs where a multi-product
retailer earns very low/negative margins on certain items, which are compen-
sated for with additional mark-ups on other products sold in the store. Due to
the large range of items sold in a supermarket, up to 20,000 (Checkout Ireland,
1996), the consumer will only know the prices of a small proportion of these
goods before entering a store. These goods are henceforth referred to as “Known-
Value Items” (KVIs). The KVIs exhibit a high degree of consumer price awareness
and are generally characterised by frequently purchased or staple products.
The prices of all other goods, non-KVIs, are unknown to the consumer prior to
entering a particular outlet. The information costs that are associated with
finding out the relative price of non-KVIs in different outlets become a component
of the switching costs for consumers. Once consumers have entered the outlet
therefore, switching costs result in spatial market power that allows the retailer
to extract large price-cost mark-ups on non-KVIs. These features allow retailers
to sell certain items below-cost in an endeavour to attract consumers into the
store, and to charge higher prices on other goods once the customer has entered.
The minority view of the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) in the 1991 enquiry
to the Groceries Order felt that below-cost selling is “an artifice, a trick, or a
2. This assumes no competition between Multiples and Independents. Clearly there may be
some degree of interdependence in urban areas, but this is small and not a predominant feature of
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gimmick … the purpose [of which] is essentially to mislead the customer” (Fair
Trade Commission Report, 1991, pp. 117-118). The ability of larger retailers to
price below cost in the years up to 1987 was thought to have had “distorting and
anti-competitive effects” (FTC Report, 1991, p. 101). The 1980 Restrictive Practice
Commission enquiry to the grocery trade concluded that should “concentration
in the grocery trade advance in the future, …, then all factors which might
increase the degree of concentration, including the practice of below cost selling,
would have to be seriously reconsidered” (RPC Report, 1980, p. 34). The demise
of H. Williams from the market and the spate of supermarket price wars that
followed, finally instigated a ban on below-cost selling under article 11 of the
1987 Groceries Order in an effort to halt the spiral of rising concentration.3 The
pricing strategies of larger retailers and the predicted adverse effect that these
may have for smaller outlets was the driving force behind the implementation
of the ban. Proponents of the ban claimed that larger retailers manipulate
consumers’ imperfect information through competing aggressively on KVIs in
order to attract market share, and compensating with higher margins on non-
KVIs once the consumer has entered the store. This was deemed to be essentially
predatory in effect, driving a more concentrated structure and reducing welfare
in the long run.
The current mature dual configuration of the groceries market suggests that
such a marketing device does not affect the structure of the Independent
“convenience” niche in urban areas. Those who favour a prohibition of loss leading
in the “one-stop” market in an endeavour to protect the “convenience” sector
from annihilation are fundamentally flawed in their broad definition of the
market, which assumes close competition between both of these niche segments.
As argued above, this is not representative of the structure of the national
market. The structure of the national market is an outcome of efficient restruc-
turing induced by demand and supply side forces. These forces ensured the
continued restructuring of the grocery market, even in the presence of the ban.
IV  A THEORETICAL RATIONALE FOR LOSS LEADING
The analysis of the market in terms of its dual configuration dictates whether
the ban on below-cost selling can be justified on sound economic principles. Can
loss leading be considered a predatory activity that has adverse consequences
for concentration structure and welfare within “one-stop” or “convenience”
3. With the exception of “best before” goods which have expired before the date of minimum
durability and “seasonal” goods, article 11 applies to all grocery products that fall within the scope
of the Order. These include (i) all goods for human consumption excluding fresh fruit and vegetables,
fresh and frozen meats, fresh and unprocessed frozen fish; (ii) intoxicating liquor for consumption
off premises and (iii) other household necessities usually purchased in a grocery shop.76 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
segments of retailing? This is the real issue surrounding the desirability of a
ban on below-cost selling. New theories on price discrimination in imperfectly
competitive markets suggest that price dispersion across different market seg-
ments/products may in fact be a legitimate by-product of a competitive process.
Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1989) outline the potential importance of both
“Competitive-Type” and “Monopoly-Type” price discrimination in an imperfectly
competitive market. A monopolist selling into markets differentiated by the
elasticity of industry demand can increase revenues by price discriminating in
favour of more industry elastic consumers. Pricing thus only takes into account
the density of consumers that decide to buy, or not to buy, for a range of prices in
the different market segments. In imperfectly competitive markets however,
price discrimination can also reflect heterogeneity in consumer cross-price
elasticities as dictated by the willingness and ability of consumers to switch
between suppliers over a range of prices. This will lead to price discrimination
favouring consumers with higher cross-price elasticities in an endeavour to
protect market share. Where cross-price effects dominate pricing strategies in
imperfectly competitive markets therefore, price discrimination is used as a
means of defending market share rather than an instrument for extracting
additional rent from the market.4
In the context of the Irish groceries sector, it is the ability of consumers to
switch between alternative retail outlets that dominate pricing strategies. In
the “one-stop” market, retail outlets are selected on the basis of value for money.
Consumers display a high degree of price awareness and tendency to switch
outlets on the basis of KVI prices. As a result, competition over the consumer
base may induce price discrimination favouring the more cross-price elastic KVIs
to protect market share. While retailers within the “convenience” niche are
insulated from competition with other outlets to a certain degree by virtue of
their location, “impulse” goods such as confectionery are less likely to be protected
from competing forces than other “top-up” items. Independents are the main
channel for the distribution of “impulse” items and contribute significantly to
retailer turnover. For these types of good, most outlets carry a full range of
brands that are closely monitored by the manufacturer. Consumers are able to
switch between alternative brands and retail outlets at low cost and display a
price sensitivity to this range of goods that is not present for other “top-up”
items sold in Independent stores. Consumers exhibit a very low degree of price
awareness on non-routine “top-up” products. As a result many Independent
4. The influence of consumer switching costs on resale pricing in imperfectly competitive markets
is examined in Katz (1984), Borenstein (1991) and Shephard (1991). For an empirical distinction
between competitive and monopolistic price discrimination, see Borenstein and Rose (1994), Guilietti
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retailers price very close to marginal cost on the cross-price elastic “impulse”
products in an endeavour to maintain their customer base, while charging higher
margins on more cross-price inelastic “top-up” items to earn rent. Multi-product
retailers thus display a tendency to loss-lead on a certain range of cross-price
elastic products as a strategy for maintaining the consumer base rather than as
an instrument for extracting rent.
Bliss (1988) indicates that under the assumption of full consumer information,
where all products are assumed to be KVIs, loss leading is not an equilibrium
outcome that one should expect in a competitive environment among retailers.
The question is whether this is an equilibrium outcome we can model, and if so,
is it an outcome that is welfare reducing? As compared with Bliss (1988), we
model competition between retail stores explicitly. Rather than just using a
value for money constraint, we model competition between retailers over the
consumer using the location model of Salop (1979) as our basic framework.
We adopt Sutton’s (1991) two-stage framework in which the sub-game
equilibrium solutions are derived through a process of backward induction. In
the second stage we model price competition between multi-product retailers
for a given number of outlets in the market niche. We focus on the impact of
customer switching costs on pricing behaviour, since cross-price effects dominate
retailer pricing strategies in order to maintain the consumer base in both the
“one-stop” and “convenience” markets. Salop’s (1979) circular road model is very
conducive to modelling this effect in a multi-product setting. By setting the
industry demand elasticity equal to zero, the circular road model allows prices
to be driven purely by the cross-price elasticity of demand, which reflects the
tendency of consumers to switch outlets. We exploit this to see how prices may
vary over different product ranges supplied within the “one-stop” and “con-
venience” niches. The first stage of the game models the entry decision of potential
entrants to the market. The potential entrants are assumed to fully anticipate
both the irrecoverable fixed set-up costs and post-entry profits derived in the
final stage.
The benchmark case derives the equilibrium outcomes under conditions of
perfect consumer information where consumers are assumed to know the prices
of all goods when choosing between the different outlets. We then examine the
impact of imperfect consumer information on the equilibrium average price,
concentration, and total welfare in the loss leading case, when retailers are free
to loss-lead on a subset of goods. Finally, we examine the equilibrium outcomes
in the imperfect information case in the interventionist case, where there are
restrictions on price competition imposed by a ban on below-cost pricing. We
use the terminology KVIs and non-KVIs in our description of the model to denote
the cross-price elastic and cross-price perfectly inelastic commodities respectively.78 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
The Benchmark Case
In the final stage of the game retailers select optimal prices for a given number
of outlets in the market. We assume that N identical multi-product retailers
each sell M different products within their defined niche. While the individual
prices of these M goods may differ, they have an average price P and earn a
payoff of p. Retailer surplus is thus defined as profit net of the exogenous sunk
costs of entry, s,
   RS =p-s ;    s >0 (1)
Consumers are located uniformly on a circle with a circumference equal to
one where the density of consumers is assumed to be unitary around the circle.
The outlets are located symmetrically around the circle and the corresponding
distance between outlets is thus equal to 1/N. Consumers are modelled to have
a transport cost, t, per unit of distance travelled, d, to each outlet located on the
circle. Once a customer has selected an outlet they commit to purchasing one
unit of each of the M goods sold. The utility of the representative consumer is
given by,
   U = C - PM - td (2)
This describes the marginal utility per basket of goods net of expenditure and
transport costs, where    C is the consumer reservation price for the basket of
goods.
A utility maximising consumer with full information chooses an outlet based
on the relative levels of expenditure on the M goods and transport costs incurred.
The consumer becomes indifferent in her/his choice of outlet when the sum of
these factors are equal for alternative outlets either side of their location on the
circle. The equation of the indifferent consumer is thus given by,
  










The number of consumers that enter each store is equal to 2d. This will include
all consumers located close to an outlet up to the indifferent consumer either
side of the outlet. Hence the number of consumers, Ei, that enter a representative
outleti can be solved from Equation (3) as,
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For simplicity we set the variable cost of production equal to zero. The payoff
for outlet i can thus be written as,
   pi = PiMEi (5)
Under a Bertrand strategy, all outlets select prices simultaneously and
independently. Holding the average price P in all other outlets constant, an
outlet selects Pi to maximise (5). The profit maximising first order condition
may be written as,
  
piPi = PiMEiPi + EiM = 0 (6)
In a symmetric equilibrium Pi = P. The resultant solution function for the optimal













Hence total expenditure on the basket of M goods is equivalent to t/N. Since
N identical outlets are located symmetrically on the circle, each outlet has an
equal share of the market, 1/N, and the average price-cost mark-up on each of
the M goods is the same in every outlet operating in their relevant niche. From











A critical point in this price competition stage is the result that total consumer
expenditure on the entire basket of M goods is equivalent to customer switching
costs. Bertrand competition for market share induces aggressive price
undercutting by retail outlets that are differentiated only in terms of their
location on the circle. This competitive process prevents retailers from extracting
a premium above consumer willingness to pay for locational convenience as
determined by the proximity, and hence the number, of outlets on the circle and
transport costs per unit of distance travelled. In this model of full information
the total transport cost in moving from one outlet to another, t/N, defines the
level of switching costs for each consumer and hence the total premium which
may be extracted from each consumer in equilibrium. This in turn is allocated
between the M goods. It is possible that the individual mark-up on each of the
M goods can vary. Under perfect information, Bliss (1988) predicts that80 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
constrained price discrimination based on Ramsey pricing rules determine
pricing. This paper does not concern itself with this issue but models explicitly
what is an exogenous value for money constraint in Bliss’s paper.
In the first stage of the game we solve for the equilibrium number of outlets
where the entry decision is made in full anticipation of the post-entry equilibrium
profit received and the sunk costs, s > 0, associated with entry. The last entrant
to the market is indifferent between entering and not, as post-entry profits pi
just cover the exogenous sunk costs of entry si. Given this condition and the
expected profit levels set out in equation (8), we solve for the long run equilibrium






   (9)
The larger the per unit transport cost, t, the more post-entry equilibrium
profit and hence the more fragmented the industry becomes over the long run.
The exogenous sunk cost, s, acts as a barrier to entry in the market. Long run
welfare resulting in this industry is equal to the sum of retailer and consumer
surplus, as derived from Equations (1) and (2), aggregated over each of the N
outlets. In equilibrium, total expenditure on the basket of M goods, given by
Equation (7), is equal to t/N. Outlets are located symmetrically around the circle
and charge the same price per basket of goods. The distance travelled by
indifferent consumers, x and y, either side of an outlet is   
1
2N. Total welfare for
the representative outlet, Oi, in equilibrium can thus be depicted in Diagram 1.
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Outlet i captures all consumers located up to the indifferent consumers, x
and y, on either side of the location. Total retailer surplus is given by area A net
of the sunk costs of entry. Net consumer surplus is represented by the sum of
areas D plus E. This illustrates total consumer surplus net of transport cost
areas B plus C. In equilibrium, the welfare for an individual outlet as given by
expressions (1) plus (2) can be written as the following,
     




















Total net welfare is equal to the sum of retailer and consumer surplus, as defined
in (10), times the number of outlets in the market in equilibrium. Multiplying (10)
by N and substituting from Equation (9) that expresses N in terms of t and s , we
solve for overall welfare as follows,
   W = C - 1.25 st (11)
Imperfections in the market induce a gap between social and private net
benefits in laissez faire retailing. Total welfare, W, is bounded between the first
best outcome,    C, and zero when switching costs on the circle equal reservation
expenditure. Transport costs and exogenous barriers to entry result in
equilibrium price divergences from marginal cost being sustained in the long
run. In the absence of these factors total consumer surplus on the circle is    C
which defines our bliss point or first best outcome in terms of total long run
welfare. Higher transport and exogenous sunk costs push welfare outcomes
towards zero.
The Loss Leading Case
In the above two-stage game there was an explicit assumption that consumers
had full information on the average price of the M goods in each outlet when
making their optimal outlet choice. The desire to maintain the consumer base
ensures that total rent earned on the basket of M goods purchased by each
consumer will not exceed the switching costs of travelling to another outlet. We
now examine the equilibrium outcomes for the profit maximising retailer when
consumers are assumed to have imperfect information on the prices of the basket
of M goods in making an outlet choice. More precisely, consumers have zero
information on one subset of items and full information on another.
In the final stage of the game, N identical retailers sell M different products
that may be segmented into KVIs and non-KVIs. Of the M goods, a fraction, F,
are classified as KVIs and are sold at an average price P. All remaining goods,
(1–F), are non-KVIs sold at an average price of P·. We assume that the value of82 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
F is predetermined by factors such as the frequency of purchase and hence is
exogenous in our model. Since the consumer has no information on non-KVIs
before entering a store, it is assumed that expenditure on KVIs, as well as
transport costs, determines their choice of outlet. We assume that once a customer
commits to an outlet they will buy one unit of each of the M goods, including
non-KVIs, providing total expenditure does not exceed their reservation
expenditure for the basket of goods. Another way of thinking of this, is that
finding out information on non-KVIs in alternative outlets incurs information
costs and transport costs that exceed reservation expenditure. Switching outlets
and incurring information costs is not a feasible option for the consumer in this
scenario. We modify this assumption in the next section. The retailer, as an
extreme assumption, is handed localised monopoly power over the pricing of
non-KVIs. The question is whether the retailer is able to extract maximum
rents up to the reservation expenditure for the basket of goods from his consumer
base,    C/N?
Under conditions of imperfect information, consumers choose outlets based
upon relative levels of expenditure on KVIs and transport costs. The equation
of the indifferent consumer may be written accordingly,
  










This allows us to solve for the number of consumers, Ei, that enter an outlet
as the following,
  







Equation (13) represents the augmented demand function an outlet faces
when consumers lack price information on the full range of products in an outlet.
The payoff for a representative outlet is decomposed into revenue from KVIs
and non-KVIs. Assuming zero variable costs for simplicity, the payoff for outlet
i can now be written as,
   pi = PiFMEi + Pi
·(1-F)MEi (14)
As before, the average price of KVIs is simultaneously and independently
determined in all outlets on the circle. An outlet chooses Pi to maximise (14),
given the prices of non-KVIs, P· and    Pi
·, and holding the average price of KVIs
in all other outlets, P, constant. The first order condition may be written as
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piPi = PiFMEiPi +F MEi + (1-F)MPi
·EiPi = 0 (15)
In a symmetric equilibrium where Pi = P and    Pi
· = P
·, the solution function













Since N identical outlets are located symmetrically on the circle, each has an
equal share of consumers, 1/N. Using the equilibrium prices obtained for KVIs


























Thus, we observe that for any combination of P
· and P the total rent earned
by each outlet remains equal to (8) in the full information benchmark case.
While (18) is not a closed solution, it is a binding constraint on the pricing of
KVIs that prevents retailers from earning premiums above the transport costs
of each consumer. The presence of imperfect information and the assumption
that once a consumer commits to an outlet there is no incentive to switch to
alternative stores at first sight appears to give retailers an opportunity to extract
consumers reservation expenditures in equilibrium. However, Bertrand price
competition induces aggressive price undercutting strategies on KVIs. This
ensures that any additional premiums generated by information costs associated
with non-KVIs are fully dissipated by price cuts on KVIs in equilibrium. Once
again, consumers only pay a premium equivalent to switching costs in the full
information case as determined by the degree of horizontal differentiation
between outlets on the circle. All outlets would benefit from co-operative
restraints on loss leading. However the option to utilise price to manipulate
imperfect information induces a strategic rival response which in turn increases
short-run competition in an imperfectly competitive market. This turns out to
be beneficial to welfare as the overall payoff that an outlet can extract in
equilibrium, even in the presence of imperfect information, remains equal to
that extracted under perfect consumer information.84 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
Since the overall rent earned under imperfect information with price dis-
crimination in favour of certain items remains equal to the benchmark case,
the equilibrium number of outlets that exist on the circle as determined by
forward looking outlets, remains equal to the full information endogenous
outcome described in Equation (9). Hence, retailer and consumer surplus remain
unchanged as in (11). This provides our first proposition:
Proposition One: In the optimal pricing of multi-product retailers under
conditions of imperfect consumer information, loss leading on a subset of
products is an equilibrium outcome used to protect market share which
leaves retailer surplus, welfare, and the structure of the market at full
consumer information levels in the long run.
Equation (16) illustrates that loss leading in the groceries market is an
equilibrium outcome under imperfect information. Products in this model are
segmented by heterogeneities in the cross-price elasticity. This forces competitive
price discrimination in favour of KVIs/“impulse” to maintain the customer base,
which does not generate additional rents for the retailer. In this sense, the
strategic response of rivals makes the laissez faire outcome self correcting.
Intervention in the form of price controls is not justified on the basis of improving
welfare to laissez faire full information levels. In the “convenience” sector, price
leading can take place by pricing closer to marginal cost on some (“impulse”)
products contributing significantly to turnover in the Independent outlet, relative
to other (“top-up”) products on which the retailer maintains rents. In the “one-
stop” market, loss leading under conditions of imperfect information acts as a
signalling device used to convey information to the consumer on the overall
value for money to be obtained from the total basket of M goods.5 It is a
commitment on behalf of the “one-stop” retailer to ensure maximum value for
money in a particular outlet. Moreover, Equation (16) indicates that loss leading
on KVIs in the “one-stop” market may involve below-cost pricing. This is due to
the opportunity that the “one-stop” retailer has to recuperate these losses through
higher pricing on the vast range of non-KVIs in the store. The average price of
KVIs will be less than marginal cost providing total expenditure on non-KVIs
exceeds that of KVIs, which is likely given the features of the market. The
analysis of the ban on below-cost pricing undertaken in the next section will
5. An alternative mechanism available to process information involves the conversion of non-
KVIs to KVIs through expenditure on promotions or advertising. This would lead to an increase in
sunk costs and a more concentrated market structure in the long run. The equilibrium outcome in
the final stage of the game would be unaffected however, as profits remain equal to (8) for any value
of F. Since loss leading can achieve the same outcome at no additional cost to the retailer, the
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therefore only apply to the implications that this has for competition within the
“one-stop” niche.
The Interventionist Case
Developing the previous section, we consider a blanket prohibition on below-
cost selling and the repercussions this has for equilibrium profits and correspond-
ing concentration and welfare levels in the market. As illustrated in Equation
(16), this analysis only applies to the “one-stop” niche where the wide range of
non-KVIs sold at higher prices is likely to induce a loss leading equilibrium that
involves selling below cost.
In the final stage of the game, our analysis is augmented by restricting the
multi-product retailer to pricing KVIs at or above marginal cost. The price of
non-KVIs is now endogenised to explicitly incorporate the information costs
involved in finding out the value of the basket of goods in each outlet. Switching
costs now include both transport and information costs. We assume that infor-
mation costs are proportional to the transport cost of moving from one outlet to
another. In contrast to the loss leading scenario however, it is now assumed
that information plus transport costs do not exceed consumer reservation
expenditure    C.6 Once a consumer enters an outlet they have the option of
switching to alternative stores if total expenditure exceeds the costs of switching,
transport plus information costs. Overall switching costs are represented by
d(t/N) where d>1. Higher values of d reflect greater information costs for the
consumer. If d = 1 there are no informational costs to the consumer and switching
costs are equivalent to those in the benchmark case. The total rent earned from
consumer expenditure in a symmetric equilibrium with each outlet charging
the same price and attracting an equal market share of 1/N is equal to the total










ø ÷;    d >1 (19)
Restricting retailers to pricing KVIs at or above marginal cost prevents the
additional rents earned on non-KVIs from being dissipated fully by price cuts
on KVIs. Rather than allowing competition on KVIs as a mechanism to disperse
information to the consumer, consumers now have to incur information costs.
Restricting competition on KVIs allows consumer imperfect information to be
6. In the previous section the results were derived on the basis of a stricter assumption that
consumers would not have the incentive to switch outlet by incurring information costs. This simply
reinforces the power of the results in the loss leading case.86 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
manipulated and results in higher equilibrium rents for firms.
In the first stage of the game we solve for the equilibrium number of outlets
where the entry decision is made in full anticipation of the ex-post entry profit
received. The last entrant enters until the exogenous sunk costs, s, just equals
equilibrium post-entry profits described in Equation (19). Hence, solving for







Equation (20) is equivalent to the equilibrium number of firms that exist in
the benchmark case if d = 1, or if d > 1 and there is loss leading. For values of d
> 1 where there are restrictions on price competition, the market will evolve to
a more fragmented structure in the “one-stop” niche. More outlets, or branches
of Multiple retail outlets, on the circle will reduce the degree of horizontal product
differentiation in the market and overall transport costs for consumers. However,
the average prices which consumers must pay for their basket of M goods
increases with a restriction on price competition under imperfect information.
We examine the impact that a ban on below-cost pricing has for overall welfare
using Diagram 1 and our new equilibrium outcome values. Total consumer





. With all outlets located
symmetrically around the circle and charging the same price per basket of goods,





. Welfare in each outlet is equal to the sum of retailer and consumer
surplus in each outlet. We express welfare in each outlet as the following,
     




















Total net welfare is equal to the sum of retailer and consumer surplus times,
the number of outlets in the market in equilibrium as defined in Equation (20).
This solves as,
   W = C - (d+.25) st (22)
Thus, welfare under the interventionist case where restrictions are imposed
on price competition declines at an increasing rate towards zero with d. In one
limiting case welfare can be zero where switching costs between outlets just
equal consumer’s reservation expenditure. In the other limiting case, welfare
would capture full reservation consumer expenditure. When d = 1, we get theA RATIONALE FOR REPEALING THE 1987 GROCERIES ORDER 87
same expression for welfare as in the second best outcome of (11), the benchmark
or imperfect information loss leading welfare outcomes. Welfare here is a third
best outcome compared to the bliss point and the outcome in (11). With the
restrictions on price competition consumers can no longer use prices on KVIs as
an indicator of value for money. Information costs and the ban on loss leading
allow firms to extract more of consumers’ reservation expenditure compared to
just transport costs.
Proposition Two: Compared with the laissez faire outcomes, the prohi-
bition of below-cost selling in the pricing of multi-product retailers under
imperfect consumer information and imperfect competition ensures that
welfare declines to a third best outcome.
Price intervention has the effect of imposing a distortion on the market that
alters market structure and long-run welfare and produces a third best outcome.
Contrary to the objectives of anti-trust policy, implementing price restraints
under imperfect information actually reduces overall welfare as compared with
laissez faire full information and loss leading outcomes, rather than pushing
outcomes toward first best levels.
V  CONCLUSION
Below-cost pricing by larger retailers in the Irish retail grocery market was
considered to be an unfair means of competition in the short run that drives a
more concentrated structure and is welfare reducing in the long run. The main
foundations for these views rest on the sharp decline of the Independent retailing
sector with the growth of larger supermarkets since the 1970s and the
characteristic feature of imperfect consumer information in the groceries market.
However, implementing a ban on below-cost selling with the objective of
protecting the smaller independent sector and halting the rise in concentration
is based on a misplaced rationale. Closer analysis illustrates an evolution of the
urban retail groceries market to a dual structure that is a natural outcome of
the market.
Within the “one-stop” or “convenience” market the desirability of loss leading
as a pricing strategy hinges on the ability of the retailer to extract rents from
the consumer through exploiting the imperfect information and switching cost
features of the market. Our theoretical framework examines pricing strategies
of retailers in the same market niche. Loss leading, involving price discrimination
in favour of a subset of cross-price elastic products, is shown to be a competitive
tool used by multi-product retailers to protect market share rather than an
instrument for extracting additional rent from the market. Competition for the
consumer base results in aggressive price cutting on KVIs to attract consumers88 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
into the store, until all rents earned on the non-KVIs are dissipated. In our
model loss leading in the presence of imperfect information is an equilibrium
outcome that leaves prices, welfare, and market structure in the long run
equivalent to the full information benchmark outcomes. The strategic response
of rivals makes the laissez faire outcome self correcting. Placing restrictions on
price competition, through a prohibition on below-cost selling, distorts the
competitive process and unambiguously reduces overall welfare.
Given our theoretical framework we feel that the removal of the ban on below-
cost selling and exposure of the groceries retail market to the disciplines of the
1991 Competition Act would be beneficial for the national market. Under the
Act, loss leading would be allowed unless this has as its “object or effect the
prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition”, in which case liability under
section 4 would render this practice undesirable.7
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Regional Market Share Data
Total State Reg. Reg. Reg. Reg.
I1 II III  IV
1990 1994 1995 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996
All Multiples 49.6 57 53.8 53.7 79.6 55.2 42.0 27.3
Powers2 20.9 24.5 25.3 26.6 41.9 29.3 17.8 11.5
Dunnes Stores 20.4 22 21.3 18.3 20.5 18.7 17.8 14.4
Superquinn 4.2 5 5.4 6.5 14.0 7.0 2.2 0.1
Roches 1.7 1.5 1.8 2.3 3.0 0.1 4.1 1.4
L&N 2.5 4
All Symbols 25.7 24 27.5 27.3 8.8 24.9 38.4 43.9
Musgraves3 14.2 15 18.7 18.6 5.0 20.1 30.0 20.9
Spar 4.6 4 3.6 3.7 1.6 0.9 4.1 10.2
Mace 2.8 2 1.9 1.9 0.1 0.8 3.0 4.7
Other Symbols 4.2 3 3.3 3.0 1.5 3.1 1.3 8.1
Independents 24.7 19 18.7 19 11.6 19.9 19.6 28.8
All Grocers 100 100 100 100          10090 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
Figure 1: Retail Food Concentration, 1977-1996
Figure 2: Number of Independent Outlets
No. Outlets (’000)